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█ Riassunto  È evidente? Metodo fenomenologico e psicopatologia del senso comune - Il presente articolo si pro-
pone di mettere in luce la rilevanza teorica della fenomenologia per la psicopatologia. A tal fine, 
l’argomentazione sarà focalizzata sul lavoro dello psichiatra tedesco Wolfgang Blankenburg. Nel concepire e 
sviluppare la sua cosiddetta “psicopatologia del senso comune”, Blankenburg fa costantemente appello alla 
fenomenologica husserliana ed instaura con essa un dialogo proficuo sul piano teorico ed epistemologico. 
Questo confronto consente a Blankenburg, da un lato, di elaborare un approccio alla psicopatologia fondato 
fenomenologicamente e, d’altro lato, di ridefinire lo statuto della psicopatologia stessa come disciplina scien-
tifica. Attraverso l’analisi critica dei lavori di Blankenburg e la valutazione del suo reinvestimento di alcuni 
momenti centrali del pensiero di Husserl, si mostrerà come questi possano avere un impatto di rilievo 
nell’ambito della psicopatologia. In particolare, si discuterà come i due pilastri del metodo fenomenologico 
husserliano, l’epoché e la descrizione eidetica, possano svolgere un ruolo considerevole nelle ricerche di psi-
copatologia. 
PAROLE CHIAVE: Blankenburg; Husserl; Metodo; Psicopatologia fenomenologica; Evidenza naturale. 
 
█ Abstract  This article seeks to highlight the methodological relevance of  phenomenology for psycho-
pathology. With this aim, it particularly focuses on the work of the German psychiatrist, Wolfgang Blanken-
burg. In developing his “psychopathology of common sense”, Blankenburg engages in a thoughtful dialogue 
with phenomenology. This allows him, on the one hand, to propose a phenomenologically grounded ap-
proach to psychopathology and, on the other hand, to redefine the epistemological status of psychopatholo-
gy as a scientific discipline. The critical analysis of Blankenburg’s clinical works and theoretical positions, 
and notably the evaluation of his assessment of some central moments in Husserl’s phenomenology, will elu-
cidate how the latter can contribute to research in psychopathology. Particularly, it will be shown how the 
two keystones of Husserl’s phenomenological method, namely the epoché and the eidetic description, can be 
fruitfully implemented in psychopathological research. 
KEYWORDS: Blankenburg; Husserl; Method; Phenomenological Psychopathology; Self-evidence. 
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ONE OF THE CENTRAL CONCERNS in the 
first part of Husserl’s Philosophie als strenge 
Wissenschaft,1 is a critique of naturalistic and 
reductionist approaches to consciousness, 
which are based on the assumption that the 
experimental methods of the natural sciences 
provide a model for the investigation of sub-
jective experience.  
Husserl presents such an approach as being 
dominant in the psychology of his time. How-
ever, it  is clear that developments in the cogni-
tive sciences and the neurosciences have fur-
ther increased the popularity of these, often un-
reflected, methodological and epistemological 
assumptions. As a response, in the just men-
tioned essay, Husserl advocates the necessity of 
taking the specificity of psychic phenomena 
seriously, and consistently elaborating a proper 
method of research, capable of addressing this 
specificity without misconceiving it or reducing 
it to other ontological regions.  
Since it is precisely the phenomenological 
method which is expected to be able to 
acheive this task, the question Husserl raises 
eventually touches on the relationship be-
tween phenomenology and the other sciences 
concerned with the study of consciousness. 
Clearly, the science Husserl has here in mind 
is psychology. However, there is another sci-
ence of psychic phenomena, which poses some 
radical questions for phenomenology and 
which may, at the same time, also deeply prof-
it from the phenomenological method. This 
science is psychopathology. 
On the one hand, the questions on which 
psychopathology confronts phenomenology 
are radical, since they concern the basic struc-
tural moments of experience and their altera-
tions. Consistently, these questions compel 
phenomenology to further refine the concep-
tual and methodological tools adopted to de-
scribe the phenomena under consideration.  
What is required is, in other words, a rig-
orous analysis of the dynamics of lived experi-
ence, which focuses not only on its ongoing 
consistency and Einstimmigkeit, but also on 
the meaning and the impact of the Unstim-
migkeiten. The latter, as is well known, makes 
up the phenomenological core of anomalous 
experiences and, in radical cases, of pathologi-
cal experiences.  
On the other hand, psychopathology can 
also profit from a dialogue with phenomenol-
ogy. Taking a descriptive stance, and focusing 
on the experience of patients in their interac-
tion with psychiatrists, a phenomenologically 
grounded psychopathology contrasts those 
trends that end up reducing psychiatry to a 
branch of neuropathology. This is not meant 
to imply that psychiatry should only concen-
trate on the mind and leave the whole dimen-
sion of corporeality to the natural sciences, 
such as biology or neurophysiology.  
On the contrary, the body, in its constitu-
tive ambiguity (meanwhile as Leib and as 
Körper), is one of the main focuses of phe-
nomenological psychopathology. Moreover, 
the latter also takes the biological dimensions 
of life into account2 and is particularly open to 
those trends in biological research that em-
phasize the dynamics of interaction between 
the organism and its environment.3  
Yet, since psychopathology is concerned 
with disturbances that affect the human being 
as a psycho-physical unity, and since the latter 
is not only an organism embedded in a sur-
rounding world, but also a subject participat-
ing in an intersubjective context of meaning 
(the life-world), the range of inquiry clearly 
goes beyond that of biology. It includes, in-
stead, all those moments that contribute to 
making meaningful experience.  
Thus, pathological expressions that be-
come manifest in behavioral structures cannot 
be intended as mere symptoms of disturb-
ances at the sub-personal level. They should 
rather be primarily considered in terms of the 
meaning they convey to the experiencing sub-
ject, or the lack thereof.  
The aim of this article is to discuss the rel-
evance of Husserl’s phenomenology for phe-
nomenological psychopathology. Even though 
the appeal to phenomenology in the very des-
ignation of the latter discipline may suggest 
that the problem is already solved from the 
beginning, such an appeal is still in need of a 
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more precise qualification. Indeed, adopting a 
phenomenological-descriptive method, such 
as Jaspers for instance does in his Allgemeine 
Psychopathologie, does not necessarily mean 
that this method fully coincides with the Hus-
serlian one.4  
Moreover, several authors in phenomeno-
logical psychopathology distance themselves 
from Husserl’s transcendental approach and 
from his account of the a priori. This primarily 
because, in their view, both aspects of Hus-
serl’s phenomenology would eventually ne-
glect the facticity of experience.5 Accordingly, 
they appeal to other thinkers in the phenome-
nological tradition, such as Heidegger and 
Merleau-Ponty.  
Given this situation, we shall ask: (1) whe-
ther the appeal to Husserlian phenomenology 
might still be of relevance for phenomenologi-
cal psychopathology, and (2) what are the el-
ements in Husserl’s philosophy that contrib-
ute most to the development of the discipline.  
In this essay, I will argue for an affirmative 
answer to the first question and seek to bring 
to the fore the elements that allow us to an-
swer the second. My suggestion is that the rel-
evance of Husserl’s phenomenology for phe-
nomenological psychopathology cannot be 
discarded on the basis of a critique of the sub-
ordination of the existential to the essential 
and transcendental order.  
To support this claim, I particularly focus 
on the works of Blankenburg. In his writings, 
the appeal to Husserl’s phenomenology plays 
a pivotal role in the elaboration of a “psycho-
pathology of common sense”. Confronting 
Blankenburg’s with Husserl’s positions, I ex-
pect to provide an answer to the second ques-
tion and to highlight the aspects in Husserl’s 
philosophy that contribute most to research in 
psychopathology. 
 
█ The loss of natural self-evidence and the 
psychopathology of common sense 
 
 The Loss of the Natural Self-Evidence [Der 
Verlust der natürlichen Selbstverständlichkeit] 
is the title of Blankenburg’s habilitation trea-
tise, published in 1971.6 This title is a quote 
from an interview with a young schizophrenic 
patient, whose case Blankenburg exposes to 
exemplify his approach to the so-called “psy-
chopathology of common sense”.  
The latter concept, which has experienced 
a revival in current phenomenological psychi-
atry,7 is intended to comprehend the disturb-
ances of the most basic structural moments of 
lived experience. Notably, these disturbances 
concern: (a) the relationship between cogni-
tion and action; (b) the relationship between 
reflection and pre-reflective givenness; (c) the 
implicit presuppositions of experience; (d) the 
relationship with other subjects.8 
Blankenburg’s essay particularly emphasiz-
es interweaving philosophical and clinical as-
pects in the definition of psychiatry and its 
tasks. Such an interweaving is already implicit 
in the forward, where Blankenburg exposes 
the two main tasks of his work. The first task 
is philosophical and consists in highlighting 
the essential embedding of the subject in the 
life-world. The second task is of a clinical na-
ture and coincides with the reassessment of 
schizophrenia, particularly in its early stages, 
as a disturbance concerning this primary em-
bedding.9 
What emerges as Leitmotiv in Blanken-
burg’s reports of his interviews with the pa-
tient is the experience of a profound perplexi-
ty [Ratlosigkeit] concerning different aspects 
of every-day life.  What the patient misses is 
«something small, so strange, something im-
portant, without which it is impossible to 
live».10 Thus, quasi-paradoxically, the experi-
ence of lack concerns something that is at the 
same time small and extremely important, so 
important as to be absolutely necessary to 
continue living. As the patient herself says, the 
experience is that of lacking support: «I simp-
ly find that I still need support. In all the sim-
plest things of every-day life I need support. 
What I miss is natural self-evidence».11 
The diagnosis of schizophrenia, in the case 
under consideration, is motivated by profound 
emotional disturbances and episodes of disso-
ciation and thought-disorders [Denkstörungen]. 
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The latter, however, do not concern abstract 
thinking and reasoning, but rather touch more 
radically on the existential self- and other-
relatedness of the patient. Indeed, while she 
tries to give more concreteness and to specify 
that “something small” she is missing, the pa-
tient refers to all those un-reflected certainties 
of every-day life, which everyone of us usually 
takes for granted.  
Thus the experience of perplexity and the 
loss of natural self-evidence are connected to a 
lack of familiarity with the surrounding world 
and its meaningfulness. The world becomes 
profoundly alien, and this experience of al-
ienness blocks common every-day actions and 
all initiative-taking. However, this should not 
be too simplistically understood as indicating 
that the lack of support and the collapse of the 
ground of un-reflected self-evidence imply an 
organically grounded, factual incapacity to 
perform actions and acquire new knowledge. 
In the case under consideration, these somatic 
prerequisites are still present.  
Such a lack of support touches, instead, on 
the experiential level of meaningfulness and 
its structural pre-conditions, such as the im-
plicit and pre-reflective awareness of being the 
source of spontaneous self-movements (the 
Husserlian “I can”), the meaningful structure 
of perception, the capacity of orientation in 
the intersubjective world, and notably auto- 
and hetero-affection. All these aspects are 
normally considered to be self-evident, 
selbstverständlich, since they should, so to say, 
“work by themselves”, without extra themati-
zation or decision making.  
They belong, in other words, to the sphere 
of pre-reflective awareness, which embraces 
all those pre-thematic subjective accomplish-
ments that are the ground for explicit theoret-
ical and practical activities.12  
Accordingly, natural self-evidence is de-
fined by virtue of its double character: both as 
pre-thematic and fundamental for the unfold-
ing of experience. Its being commonly taken 
for granted may even make it appear rather 
jejune.13 And nevertheless it remains some-
thing quite fundamental for the unfolding of 
our experience. Concretely, we can render the 
central moments making up natural self-
evidence by resorting to what Straus calls the 
“axioms” of every-day life. These “axioms” are 
the undemonstrable truths that make experi-
ence possible at all levels beginning with the 
sensory ones.  
In short, Straus’s axioms of every-day life 
concern: (1) the  necessity of the correlation 
between subjectivity and the world; (2) the co-
belonging of sensing [Empfinden] and mov-
ing; (3) the experience of the world as a uni-
tary correlate of sensible experience, i.e. as in-
tersensorially given; (4) the presence of inter-
subjective relationships from the most basic 
domains of experience; (5) the assumption of 
implicit rules that define the ground of social 
interaction.14  
Like Straus’s axioms, what Blankenburg 
describes as natural self-evidence apparently 
shares some common features with Husserl’s 
account of the general thesis of natural atti-
tude. In both cases, we are dealing with an im-
plicit assumption or “positing” regarding the 
subsistence of certain fundamental truths and 
relations, which make up the general presup-
positions of our being in the world.  
Yet I consider it more appropriate to draw 
a parallel between the self-evidence Blanken-
burg and Straus are describing and what Hus-
serl in his later texts calls Bodengewissheit. The 
latter notion, indeed, designates the pre-
thematic and non-objectivating consciousness 
of the pre-givenness of the world, as the uni-
tary correlate of subjective experience, and of 
other subjects, as co-experiencing the same 
world.15  
As Husserl points out, we do not question 
such aspects of our experience of the life-
world. They eventually make up the necessary 
and fundamental «soil of self-evidences, silent 
convictions» [Boden von Selbstverständlich-
keiten, stillen Überzeugungen].16 This soil of 
tacit familiarity and silent convictions gives us 
in every-day life precisely the support Blank-
enburg’s patient is lacking. 
As Husserl again points out, we become 
aware of this soil of Selbstverständlichkeiten 
Phenomenological Method and Psychopathology of Common Sense 
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only if something in our experience of the life-
world is not working properly any longer.17 
And it is the radicalization of this experience 
of Unstimmigkeit, its extension to different 
basic moments of lived experience, that de-
fines, as Stanghellini puts it, the key vulnera-
bility factor, or predispostion to schizophrenic 
diseases.18 Such an experience of instability 
and unfamiliarity often brings patients to 
compulsively reflect upon different aspects of 
their experience, to thematize them and call 
them into question.  
This phenomenon has recently been con-
ceptualized under the heading of the psycho-
pathology of hyper-reflexivity.19 In short, this 
concept refers precisely to the compulsory 
need to reflect upon, and to explicate, those 
moments of experience that are normally tak-
en for granted. This happens precisely because 
those moments are not experienced as tacitly 
familiar any longer, but rather as being pro-
foundly alien.  
If we consider that hyper-reflexivity is one 
of the fundamental phenomena used to de-
scribe and understand the experience of 
schizophrenic patients in the pre-psychotic 
phases, we can clearly see that at this stage the 
pathology does not properly entail a loss of 
self-consciousness, but rather a disturbance 
related to an exaggerated explicit self-
consciousness, which eventually displaces im-
plicit and pre-reflexive self-awareness.  
Seeking to thematize and control the dif-
ferent moments of natural self-evidence, such 
a hyperbolic reflective attitude becomes itself 
a further source for the profound experience 
of alienness in the patient’s relationship with 
the world and other subjects. The experience 
of perplexity and the connected hyper-
reflexivity touch on three main aspects, which, 
taken together, make up the experience of Bo-
dengewissheit.20  
These aspects are: (1) the self-relatedness 
of the experiencing subject; (2) his/her world-
relatedness, i.e. the openness to the world as 
the unitary correlate of experience; and (3) 
his/her relatedness to other subjects. Each of 
these dimensions has been thoughtfully con-
sidered in Blankenburg’s analyses. Moreover, 
all of them are still objects of inquiry in con-
temporary research.  
 
█ The self-relatedness of the experiencing subject 
 
 With respect to the subject’s self-related-
ness, Blankenburg highlights the deep connec-
tion between the existential need for support, 
characterizing the loss of the natural self-
evidence, and the distinctive manifestations of 
self-consciousness in schizophrenic patients.  
Talking about subjectivity disorders or 
Ichstörungen, in this case, neither means that 
patients are factually incapable of initiative 
taking, nor that they are not explicitly con-
scious of their actions. The disturbance rather 
concerns the foundation of subjective activity: 
the source of action and its motivation lose 
their implicit legitimation, and therefore need 
to be questioned as to their very principles.  
Consistently, Blankenburg’s patient’s dis-
appointment regarding her actions, together 
with the feeling of inadequateness in relation 
to the surrounding world, «does not concern 
a given event, which is expected in vain from 
the outside, nor does it concern exclusively the 
sustaining ground of natural self-evidence. It 
rather concerns her own self as the authority 
of all grounding [Begründungsinstanz]».21  
This approach has been recently developed 
through the characterization of schizophrenia 
as an ipseity-disease. In this respect, Parnas 
and Sass have shown how such a disease 
touches the most basic layers of subjectivity, 
arguing that this entails the two connected 
phenomena of diminished self-affection and 
hyper-reflexivity.22  
In agreement with them, Fuchs has further 
discussed how both phenomena interfere with 
implicit self-experience on different levels, in-
volving corporeity, temporality, spatiality, and 
intersubjectivity.23 Accordingly, the disease 
does not imply any annihilation of the self, but 
rather its constantly and radically being called 
into question.24  
In this respect, too, Husserl’s phenome-
nology can offer important hermeneutical 
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tools. Indeed, he conceives of what we may 
call self-proximity as the main feature of pre-
reflective self-awareness. And the Selbstver-
ständlichkeit of such a primary self-experience 
is the ground of all further moments of expe-
rience.25  
 
█ The world-relatedness 
 
 Correlatively, the loss of natural self-
evidence concerns the relationship between 
the subject and the world. As we have seen, 
Blankenburg’s patient explicitly connects her 
perplexity with lack of support and the crum-
bling of the unitary ground of familiarity, 
which is the pre-condition for all sort of ex-
pectations or projects.  
Thus, what she misses is a direct and spon-
taneous relationship and openness to the 
world as the horizon of all events. In the most 
radical sense, thus, the disturbance concerns 
the experience of the world as soil and as the 
horizon of practical, emotive, and cognitive 
possibilities.26  
Being generated by such a loss of familiari-
ty, hyper-reflexivity eventually aggravates this 
loss, so that the risk of a death spiral evidently 
manifests itself.27 Profoundly influencing even 
the experience of the world, such a disease 
implies a diminishment of responsivity. Ac-
cordingly, the disturbance of self-affection is 
parallel and correlative to a disturbance of 
hetero-affection. 
 
█ The relatedness to other subjects 
 
 The very adoption of the notion of com-
mon sense to define the approach to psycho-
pathology described here – think of Kant’s 
considerations regarding sensus communis as 
gemeinschaftliches Sinn and as correlative to a 
gesamte Menschenvernunft,28 to which Blank-
enburg explicitly appeals29 – hints at the inter-
subjective dimension of experience.  
Blankenburg and several other authors in 
the current debate particularly insist on the 
structural connection between the loss of nat-
ural self-evidence and impairments in inter-
subjective experience.30 The loss of natural 
self-evidence, in other words, does not primar-
ily concern the relationship between an isolat-
ed subject and a world made up of things, but 
rather the experience of Einstimmigkeit in in-
tersubjective relationships.  
Common sense, is thus shaped in accord-
ance with the basic and mostly implicit game-
rules that make possible our Mit-Sein, our mu-
tual understanding, acting, and communi-
cating. Again, this is best explicated by Blank-
enburg’s patient:  
 
Everyone shall know how one behaves - 
has a path and a way of thinking. His act-
ing, his humanity, his sociality, all the rules 
of the game he is accomplishing: I could 
not recognize them clearly thus far. I 
missed the basis. [...] I don’t know how to 
call it. [...] I don’t know, it’s not knowing, it 
is so...Even children know that! One gets it 
otherwise so obviously.31 
  
Having discussed the main features of the 
project of the psychopathology of common 
sense, we shall now return to the questions 
asked in the introduction, concerning the rela-
tionship between this project and Husserl’s 
phenomenology.  
Some points which have already emerged 
from the previous analysis, concerning the 
contribution of Husserl’s philosophy to phe-
nomenological psychopathology shall now be 
explicitly thematized. As I will argue in the 
next section, this contribution is primarily re-
lated to Husserl’s phenomenological method. 
 
█ A question of method 
 
In his meta-theoretical writings, Blanken-
burg is primarily concerned with the question 
of the proper method for psychopathological 
research. In particular, he seeks to highlight 
the relevance of the phenomenological meth-
od for psychopathology, showing how such a 
method impinges on both the analysis of sin-
gle clinical cases, and on the redefinition of 
the epistemological status of psychopathology 
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as a scientific discipline.  
As a starting point for these methodologi-
cal reflections, I consider it fruitful to address 
Blankenburg’s assessment of the distinction 
between Jaspers’s and Husserl’s understanding 
of phenomenology and the phenomenological 
method.32 In particular, Blankenburg investi-
gates the consequences of a too drastic oppo-
sition between understanding [Verstehen] and 
explaining [Erklären], for psychiatric research.  
Stemming from Dilthey, this methodologi-
cal distinction is parallel to the one between 
spirit/mind and nature. Certainly, both dis-
tinctions cannot be simply abandoned. How-
ever, if psychopathological inquiries are fo-
cused on the human being as a psychophysical 
unity, the natural and the spiritual side cannot 
be simply opposed but should rather be con-
sidered in their reciprocal relationship. Ac-
cordingly, as suggested by Rinofner-Kreidl in 
her reading of Jaspers, a methodological plu-
ralism is required in psychopathology.  
The latter should in other words resort to 
both a descriptive method, aiming at compre-
hending psychiatric diseases as subjectivity-
disorders, and an explicative method, which 
aims to shed light on the material-bodily con-
ditions that underlie the emergence of the giv-
en pathology.33  
According to Blankenburg, Jaspers is not 
always perfectly clear in maintaining this 
methodological pluralism. Sometimes his ar-
guments suggest a dichotomy between under-
standing and explaining, which Blankenburg 
is not ready to subscribe to. Assuming under-
standing and explaining as reciprocally exclu-
sive, and observing that schizophrenic experi-
ence is not immediately understandable, Jas-
pers concludes that the only possibility for ad-
dressing the psychotic disorders characteristic 
of schizophrenia is some form of naturalistic 
explanation.  
Blankenburg’s criticism is primarily di-
rected toward such a conclusion: by resorting 
to a strict dichotomy between understanding 
and explaining, one would eventually deny the 
possibility of understanding pathologies such 
as schizophrenia. That is to say, one would 
neglect the core of sense that even pathologi-
cal experience has for the patient. As Blank-
enburg points out: 
 
Jaspers […] transformed Dilthey’s maxim, 
according to which “we explain nature, while 
we understand psychic life”, in such a way 
that it now has the following meaning: Inso-
far as we understand, we are dealing with 
non-psychotic life [nichtpsychotisches Seelen-
leben]. Where understanding ends, there be-
gins nature - be that in the form of physiolog-
ical (e.g. fatigue, sleep) or pathological pro-
cesses (i.e. in the form of the illness that de-
stroys life). In short: where understanding 
ends, there we need to explain.34 
 
Blankenburg’s criticism touches on two 
main points. First, assuming a dichotomy be-
tween understanding and explaining, Jaspers 
does not properly investigate what are the 
conditions for the possibility of understanding 
in general. This implies that the very assump-
tion of the concept of understanding remains 
in need of legitimation. Second, Jaspers’s “de-
scriptive phenomenology”, which is supposed 
to make understanding possible, is considered 
to be limited in many ways. In particular, by 
criticizing Husserl’s theory of Wesensschau as 
being too speculative, Jaspers eventually over-
looks the potential impact of eidetic phenom-
enology on psychiatry, and considers the latter 
only as an empirical science. 
The pars construens in Blankenburg’s 
methodological reflections can be read as a 
response, in many ways inspired by Husserl’s 
phenomenology, to these problems. On the 
one hand, indeed, Blankenburg questions the 
dichotomy of Verstehen and Erklären in favor 
of a more integrative approach to psychiatric 
diseases.  
On the other hand, he restores the right of 
the eidetic moment of phenomenology. This 
allows him to characterize psychopathology as 
a science that integrates both the considera-
tion of facts, and the retrieval of eidetic or 
structural moments. These methodological 
reflections set the basis for the proper descrip-
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tion of pathological phenomena, including 
those of a psychotic nature.  
From this perspective, instead of defining ex 
ante the latter phenomena as something that 
withdraws from all understanding, one should 
seek to refine the conceptual tools, and thus the 
heuristic potentialities, of psychiatry. For the 
latter is necessarily and constantly confronted 
with phenomena that challenge, or may chal-
lenge, its original conceptual framework. 
 
Already on the basis of epistemological re-
flections, in accordance with the phenom-
enological method, we cannot however […] 
be satisfied with exclusion [Ausgrenzung]. 
Rather, with respect to the new or the dif-
ferent that impresses us in schizophrenic 
patients, a new task is set, namely that of 
being concerned with an enlargement of 
our categorial potentialities, in order not to 
exclude what is abnormal, and instead to 
be able to assume it within a larger essen-
tial comprehension.35  
 
In elaborating this method, Blankenburg 
explicitly appeals to Husserl’s phenomenology. 
Particularly, he focuses on two aspects: the epo-
ché and the eidetic description. In the follow-
ing, I will develop my argument in a critical dia-
logue with Blankenburg’s considerations con-
cerning these two aspects. I thereby intend to 
highlight the relevance of Husserl’s phenome-
nological method for psychopathology. 
 
█ Epoché and psychopathology  
 
According to Blankenburg, the epoché is a 
fundamental methodological tool for the psy-
chopathology of common sense. It marks, in 
his view, the Archimedean point in order to 
scientifically phrase the question concerning 
natural self-evidence and its loss.36  
In order to assess the potentialities of this 
method for psychopathology, one should care-
fully consider its essential features and the con-
ditions for its adoption. Blankenburg’s thesis 
can be summarized as follows. Assuming that, 
in general, there must be a shared moment be-
tween the subject and the object of knowledge, 
we shall ask what this moment consists of in 
the case of schizophrenic experience.  
Jaspers, indeed, is right in claiming that 
such an experience, particularly in the most 
serious psychotic cases, withdraws from un-
derstanding. And this precisely because a 
shared context of exchange seems to be miss-
ing. According to Blankenburg, the epoché 
may instead uncover just such a common soil. 
The argument for this claim is based upon the 
analogy between the loss of natural self-
evidence and the epoché.  
What happens in schizophrenic patients 
can be described as a sort of “involuntary epo-
ché”, which corresponds to a pathological de-
generation of the epoché as it is intended in 
phenomenology. This amounts to saying that 
the loss of natural self-evidence is a compulso-
ry and uncontrollable alteration of a natural 
attitude, in which the ground of familiarity 
that makes every-day experience possible gets 
lost. As Blankenburg writes: 
 
The hypothesis made here is that in the 
loss of the natural self-evidence one has to 
do with something similar to an involun-
tary and “pathological” epoché - which not 
only brackets the relationship with the life-
world, but rather undermines it.37 
  
Even if Blankenburg is quite careful in dis-
tinguishing bracketing from undermining as 
resulting from, respectively, the epoché and the 
loss of natural self-evidence, there is still 
something disturbing in this analogy.  
Admittedly, on the one hand, we are con-
cerned with a methodological tool adopted 
within a theoretical enterprise whereas, on the 
other hand, we are facing a pathological phe-
nomenon that dramatically challenges the 
subject in existential terms. Considering that 
the difference appears to be so radical, one 
may wonder whether the analogy can be con-
sidered to be valid at all.  
To understand the meaning of this analogy 
and thus to answer this question, it is fruitful 
to first thematize the differences between the 
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phenomenological epoché and the loss of natu-
ral self-evidence. Although something in this 
thematization may appear obvious and is cer-
tainly well-known to the phenomenological 
reader, it is important to clarify why, notwith-
standing these radical differences, Blanken-
burg’s proposal is legitimate within his argu-
ment regarding the methodological founda-
tion of phenomenological psychiatry.  
Moreover, these remarks will allow me to 
show how these methodological reflections 
reverberate on the enlarging of the conceptual 
and categorial tools that Blankenburg appeals 
to in his response to Jaspers. 
The first main difference between the epo-
ché and the loss of natural self-evidence con-
cerns the freedom of accomplishment. The 
phenomenological epoché is essentially charac-
terized by Husserl as an act of freedom, which 
has both a theoretical and an ethical valence.38 
Through the analysis of the field of conscious 
experience, which is uncovered by means of the 
epoché, i.e. by the bracketing of natural attitude, 
Husserl eventually raises the philosophical 
questions of truth and its foundation. The ethi-
cal ideal of a «radical renewal of the whole 
humanity» is connected to these questions.39  
The moment of freedom that characterizes 
the accomplishment of the epoché is clearly 
something that the experience of loss of natu-
ral self-evidence completely lacks. Obviously, 
this is quite clear for Blankenburg himself who 
correctly points out that 
 
From the very beginning, the freedom of 
accomplishment [...] differentiates this 
[Husserlian M.S.] epoché from all other 
compulsory changes of attitude that seize 
the subject involuntarily and even more so 
from a change that is pathologically condi-
tioned.40  
 
Far from resulting from an act of free will, 
and far from being motivated by theoretical 
and practical aims, the suspension of natural 
self-evidence in schizophrenic experience is 
instead compulsory, and induced by factors 
that cannot be controlled by the subject. 
The second main difference is related to 
what we may call the elements of “resistance” 
to a change of attitude. Regarding the epoché, 
indeed, these elements of resistance make the 
shift between different attitudes possible. 
Even when we adopt a phenomenological 
stance, there is something of a natural attitude 
which is still implied in our experience, partic-
ularly in its practical concerns. Should we be 
endangered by a fire, we would not perform 
an epoché and suspend positing the existence 
of the fire, but simply escape.  
Accordingly, accomplishing the universal 
epoché the phenomenologist certainly puts out 
of play the interests that belong to a natural 
attitude and acquires a new theoretically ori-
ented attitude. This attitude, moreover, can 
(and does) itself become habitual and is con-
stantly actualized, whenever the relevant sci-
entific concerns are very deeply rooted and 
acquire an ethical character.  
Nevertheless, those interests characterizing 
a natural attitude are never properly lost. And 
this not only according to the rather trivial ex-
ample I just offered regarding our practical 
concerns, but also with respect to the specific 
mode of being of our interests.  
The epoché «does put all other interests 
“out of play”, yet by no means gives up their 
mode of being as our mode of being (ours, as 
“interested”) as if we would give up these in-
terests of doubt regarding their further sub-
sistence».41   
Moreover, the epoché leaves our con-
sciousness of the world as the horizonal corre-
late of experience and as soil [Weltboden].42  
In schizophrenia, instead, these “resistanc-
es” often fail, and the very mode of being of 
every-day life interests is called into question. 
Patients are overwhelmed by the questioning 
of the obviousness of experience in the differ-
ent dimensions we have previously consid-
ered. And this process of calling into question 
does not meet any counter-movement that 
would re-establish familiarity with the pre-
givenness of the world.  
For this reason, as Blankenburg points out, 
a change of attitude for these patients does 
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not simply entail the bracketing, but rather 
the loss of natural self-evidence and of implicit 
trust in the soil of experience. 
Given these fundamental differences, can 
we still consider the analogy proposed by 
Blankenburg as valid and legitimate? And is it 
really fruitful in epistemological terms? To an-
swer these questions we shall now make ex-
plicit reference to the aspect under which the 
epoché and the loss of natural self-evidence are 
considered to be analogous.  
This aspect coincides with the reflective 
detachment from the self-evidence of lived 
experience. In schizophrenia, such a detach-
ment amounts to a self-alienation with respect 
to the most basic moments of experience, that 
is to say, it concerns the Bodengewissheit of the 
life-world, with its implicit game-rules that 
make both theoretical and practical experi-
ence possible.  
Maintaining that such alienation is not simp-
ly reducible to the dialectics of the reflecting and 
reflected self, the moment of self-distancing can 
be considered as shared by the epoché and the 
loss of natural attitude. And it is precisely this 
shared moment that, in Blankenburg’s view, 
defines the common soil between the psychia-
trist and the patient, that is to say, the place 
from which the psychiatrist must begin in order 
to establish a proper approach to what appar-
ently withdraws from all understanding.  
Resorting to the epoché, thus, Blankenburg 
faces the questions regarding the conditions of 
understanding, which, in his view, remained 
unanswered by Jaspers. Unlike the latter, in 
defining the proper approach to psychiatric 
diseases Blankenburg does not appeal to the 
presentification of the other’s experiences in 
the act of understanding.43  
With respect to this approach, which even-
tually seeks to absorb the other’s experience in 
one’s own and thus to fill the gap between the 
self and the other, Blankenburg somehow 
suggests counter movement, based upon the 
recognition of a moment of alienness in all 
self-experience, including that of the psychia-
trist. To understand pathological experiences, 
indeed, he considers a «self-alienation of the 
psychiatric consciousness» to be necessary.44  
This amounts to saying that the bracketing 
of the psychiatrist’s own anchorage to the life 
world can establish a certain proximity to the 
patient’s experience. And on the basis of such 
proximity, it may be possible to share some 
aspects of the patient’s world.  
The previous discussion shows that the 
appeal to the epoché as a methodological tool 
to phenomenologically re-found psychiatry as 
a science entails both potentialities and limits, 
connected with the analogy between the epo-
ché and the loss of natural self-evidence. In-
deed, Blankenburg’s considerations have two 
main implications, which shall be carefully 
distinguished and which may even be in con-
flict with each other.   
▶ On the one hand, the epoché is intended 
as the Haltung the psychiatrist will assume to 
approach the patient’s disease. Bracketing all 
presuppositions that make up his/her own an-
chorage to the world, the psychiatrist opens 
up the field for a possible encounter with the 
patient’s experience in its alienness.  
This can be further developed in what 
Waldenfels has called a responsive therapy. 
Endorsing the dynamics of Frage und Antwort, 
responsive therapy may awaken the sense for 
what is alien and extra-ordinary, without sub-
ordinating it immediately to the proportion of 
what is normal and thus without seeking to 
contain it through normalization-processes.45 
The accomplishment of the epoché, in this 
sense, makes possible an opening to the al-
ienness of the other by precisely recognizing a 
moment of alienness in one’s own experience.  
Such recognition is a condition for being 
touched by the alienness of the other and is 
necessary in order to come closer to the core-
sense that still characterizes apparently incom-
prehensible experiences. On the basis of this 
approach, it will no longer be legitimate to ad-
dress these experiences as an abstract sympto-
matology that lacks all contact with experience. 
▶ On the other hand, however, the analogy 
between the loss of natural self-evidence and 
the epoché risks being problematic in at least 
two senses.  
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First, strictly speaking, if we formally as-
sume the analogical argument and its premise 
regarding the necessity of a shared soil pre-
supposed by understanding, we could legiti-
mate the adoption of the epoché only as a 
method suitable to address schizophrenia in 
its initial phases.  
That is to say, it would be suitable to ad-
dress a pathology characterized by the loss of 
natural self-evidence, but not other forms of 
psychiatric illness. Indeed, not all mental dis-
eases are characterized by the loss of natural 
self-evidence. Yet, if the epoché and the char-
acteristic self-distancing of psychiatric con-
sciousness that it makes possible can play a 
role in providing a methodological ground for 
psychopathology in general, then the legitima-
cy of the assumption of the epoché cannot be 
based upon its analogy with one specific illness.  
Second, and most important, the previously 
discussed differences between the epoché and 
the loss of natural self-evidence are so profound 
as to require a qualification of the very analogy. 
Voluntarily accomplishing the epoché (albeit 
such an accomplishment is itself motivated by a 
form of pathos that invites us to question im-
mediacy) amounts to reflecting upon experi-
ence in order to uncover its immanent mean-
ingfulness, its structures and dynamics.  
The motivations for such a bracketing are 
both theoretical and practical in nature. Yet 
this is something completely different from 
the loss of primal familiarity with the world of 
experience, i.e from the loss of the supporting 
soil of experience.  
Although in Blankenburg’s argument these 
two points sometimes merge, I suggest that they 
should be carefully distinguished from one an-
other. The first point, according to which the 
epoché makes it possible for the psychiatrist to 
assume a particular Haltung in the relationship 
with the patient is very promising, since it can 
indeed open up a “logic of correspondence” be-
tween the patient and the psychiatrist.46  
This “logic of correspondence” is particu-
larly fruitful insofar as it is not based on the 
reduction of alienness and alterity, nor does it 
aim to “normalize” the other. It is rather 
grounded upon a form of self-distancing of 
the psychiatrist, which allows him/her to un-
cover a moment of alienness in his/her own 
experience. The second point, instead, which 
is centered on the analogy between the epoché 
and the loss of natural self-evidence, should 
not be overemphasized and generalized.  
Besides the epoché Blankenburg’s meth-
odological writings are concerned with the 
status of the descriptions provided by phe-
nomenological psychiatry. Particularly, this 
impinges upon the qualification of the latter 
as a Tatsachen- or rather Wesenswissenschaft. 
The discussion of this further point will allow 
us to highlight another further relevant im-
pact of Husserl’s phenomenology on psychiat-
ric research. 
 
█ Psychopathology between “Tatsachen-” 
and “Wesenswissenschaft” 
 
Certainly inspired by Heidegger, authors 
in phenomenological psychopathology have 
notably stressed the indispensable facticity 
that characterizes the human being-in-the-
world. Psychopathology cannot overlook this 
fundamental moment of facticity, but should 
rather consistently assume it as a central mo-
ment of it inquiries.47  
Endorsing such an assumption, Blanken-
burg does not for this reason dodge a confron-
tation with phenomenology as an eidetic sci-
ence. For, if psychopathology certainly cannot 
overlook facticity, the preceding considera-
tions have shown that it is also in search of the 
“essence”, i.e. of the immanent structures, 
characterizing specific pathologies.  
Accordingly, Blankenburg seems to have 
accepted Husserl’s challenge regarding the 
methodological reform of empirical psycholo-
gy, and has extended it to psychopathology. 
This challenge is best formulated in Husserl’s 
Encyclopedia Britannica article. In this text, 
transcendental phenomenology is presented 
as a new a priori science based upon a rigorous 
descriptive method.  
As such, it is not only considered to be the 
organon of all rigorous philosophy, but also to 
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be able to promote a methodological reform 
of all other sciences.48 In Husserl’s view, such a 
methodological reform should primarily con-
cern the science that comes closest to phe-
nomenology, since it shares the same object of 
inquiry, namely psychology. And to endorse a 
methodological reform of psychology that is 
phenomenologically grounded means to re-
found psychology itself on the basis of the ei-
detic-descriptive method.  
Accordingly, psychology will not only be a 
factual science of conscious experiences as 
facts, but rather an eidetic science concerned 
with the immanent structure of these experi-
ences and their reciprocal relationships. Such 
a descriptive psychology is called by Husserl 
pure psychology. It is supposed to have a two-
fold function: a reforming function with re-
spect to empirical psychology, and a prepara-
tory function with respect to transcendental 
phenomenology.49 
Blankenburg subscribes to this demand for 
reform and extends it to psychopathology. 
That is to say, he believes it is possible to in-
vestigate not only the structures of the unitary 
and generally consistent unfolding of experi-
ence, but also the interruptions that under-
mine such a consistency.  
One first ingredient of this methodological 
reform is, as we have seen, the epoché: its ac-
complishment opens up the field for psychiat-
ric inquiry. A further aspect touches the status 
and the validity of psychopathological de-
scriptions and analyses. In other words: Is it 
possible to retrace an “eidos”, distinctive of 
different pathologies, that is to say, a morpho-
logical core of sense? Or should they rather be 
considered as simple facts, maybe even de-
prived of an internally consistent structure? 
Criticizing what he considers a too specu-
lative reading of Husserl’s eidetic phenome-
nology, Blankenburg believes that precisely 
these eidetic concerns are fundamental for 
psychopathological research. Characterizing, 
for instance, the initial and pre-psychotic 
phases of schizophrenia as related to the loss 
of natural self-evidence, Blankenburg puts 
forward a thesis that evidently goes beyond 
empirical inquiry and rather addresses the ei-
dos, that which structurally and essentially 
characterizes the pathology.  
Such an essence, to indirectly quote Hus-
serl again, is amorphological or vague and can 
be grasped by considering specific exemples 
and confronting singular cases. Such a varia-
tion of “normal” and “pathological” examples 
sheds light on both the invariants and the spe-
cific alterations, and this is why it allows us to 
display the essential features of both normal 
and pathological experience.  
In accordance with other representatives 
of phenomenological psychiatry, and eventu-
ally with Husserl himself, Blankenburg con-
ceives of the a priori, i.e. of the eidetic charac-
ter of description, as given in and through the 
description of concrete lived experience. Ac-
cordingly, focusing on the structural or eidetic 
moment does not mean denying the role of 
empirical reality and of facticity in a science 
like psychiatry.  
On the contrary, the eidetic or structural 
description and the analysis of concrete clini-
cal cases are connected in a double-bind rela-
tionship: the essence of a pathology, for in-
stance schizophrenia, can only be given in and 
through the encounter with the singularity of 
each patient; conversely some hypotheses 
concerning that essence must be present from 
the very beginning, at least implicitly, in order 
to make a diagnosis possible. Such circularity, 
however, is not a vicious.  
It rather hints at the dynamics of co-
implication characterizing the relationship be-
tween eidos and factum, and at the unitary, 
although complex, character of a phenomeno-
logically grounded science of experience.50  
In this respect, Blankenburg talks about 
“phenomenological experience”, and aims 
herewith to designate a constitutive moment 
of psychiatric science. Such an experience, as 
he suggests, is necessarily located on the 
threshold between facticity and the a priori: 
 
We would like instead to talk about a 
“phenomenological experience” only 
where phenomenological explication of the 
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implications of sense of intentional life has 
an immediate impact upon the empirical 
dimension of the single sciences and trans-
forms them from their basis, that is to say, 
where the objective-positivistic and the 
phenomenological-eidetic experiencing are 
connected in the unity of a regulation-
circle [Regelkreis].51 
 
Based upon the recognition of the dynamic 
relationship between the eidetic-structural 
and the factual moment of pathological expe-
rience, phenomenological psychopathology 
aims at embracing and integrating them scien-
tifically.52  
Thus, the phenomenological eidetic meth-
od is not merely in contrast with the empirical 
method. Its task is rather analogous to the one 
Husserl ascribes to pure phenomenological 
psychology, namely the task of reforming a 
discipline, the aim of which is still of a practi-
cal-clinical nature, based on solid theoretical 
grounds. And the solidity of these grounds is 
precisely due to their being deeply anchored in 
lived experience.  
 
█ Conclusions 
 
In this article, Blankenburg’s approach to 
the psychopathology of common sense has 
been considered in order to shed light on the 
impact of the phenomenological method for 
the redefinition of the epistemological status 
of phenomenological psychiatry.  
My aim was particularly to highlight the 
specific contribution that Husserl’s phenome-
nology has to offer such an epistemological en-
terprise. Particularly, in this context (although 
the same could be said for every domain of 
phenomenological inquiry), the methodologi-
cal considerations cannot be completely sepa-
rated from  the object of inquiry.  
This is the reason why I started by consid-
ering Blankenburg’s example describingof one 
of his patients and only subsequently moved 
on to the thematization of the methodological 
implications and presuppositions of these 
concrete descriptions. 
In light of the previous discussion, we are 
now in the position to answer the two ques-
tions raised in the introduction to this article, 
namely: (1) Is Husserlian phenomenology of 
relevance for phenomenological psycho-
pathology? and (2) What are the elements in 
Husserl’s philosophy that contribute most to 
the development of the discipline?  
The discussion of Blankenburg’s approach 
to the psychopathology of common sense al-
lows us to give a positiveanswer the first ques-
tion. As to the second question, we have seen 
that the contribution of Husserl’s philosophy 
to psychopathology is of great importance in-
sofar as methodology is concerned.  
Particularly, we have seen how the two 
methodological pillars of Husserl’s philoso-
phy, the epoché and the eidetic description, are 
fruitfully re-invested by Blankenburg in his 
psychopathological and methodological writ-
ings. Notably, the epoché plays an important 
role for the psychiatrist, insofar as, by sus-
pending his/her familiarity with the world of 
every-day life, it allows him to address patho-
logical disease in its characteristic alienness.  
On the other hand, the eidetic-descriptive 
approach allows us to consider pathologies 
not only as factual deviations from established 
normality. This, indeed, would be extremely 
problematic, since the classification of some-
thing as normal or pathological would eventu-
ally depend upon an empirical, quasi-
statistical, generalization, whereby, as Fou-
cault has shown, the social element of power 
should also be taken into consideration.  
The phenomenological criterion for charac-
terizing normality is, as is well known, the expe-
rience Einstimmigkeit. And certainly psychiat-
ric illnesses represent an interruption of such an 
einstimmig unfolding of experience. Neverthe-
less, this does not prevent us from recognizing 
that even these illnesses are characterized by an 
immanent structure, i.e. that they have a dis-
tinctive experiential core of sense.  
Adopting the phenomenological method 
of description, this core of sense can be un-
covered and described by inquiring into the 
interplay of Einstimmigkeit and Unstimmigkeit 
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in lived experience, as well as the phenomena 
testifying to a dimension of alienness within 
self-experience. 
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